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THE BROADENED POLICY OF THE joURNAL.-One year ago the
YALE LAW JOURNAL began its second quarter century. At that
time it found itself in the midst of a rapidly broadening develop-
ment in the School of Law. It had been the long established
tradition of the school that there was a real and worthy science of
jurisprudence and that law must be studied and taught histori-
cally, analytically, and comparatively. Especially since the early
'seventies, when the graduate curriculum was definitely organ-
ized by Professor Simeon E. Baldwin, the legal systems of Rome
and of modern Europe had been continually studied, legal con-
cepts had been analyzed, and the history of legal doctrines and
institutions had been investigated. Increased emphasis on these
lines of work has, especially in recent years, had an important
influence, as regards spirit, method, and content, on the under-
graduate as well as graduate courses.
Of necessity, this progress has been reflected in the pages of
the JOURNAL. The appieciation received from the alumni of
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the school and from legal scholars and practitioners at large
encourages still further improvement and development. The
present volume will endeavor to foster the science of jurispru-
dence, to bring home to its readers something of the deeper
phases of law and the factors in its growth, to take notice of
such defects as may appear in our own system of law as it is
actually being applied, and to draw upon other legal systems-
past and present-for the means of improvement by legislation
and judicial action.
The practice of the law must be recognized as social service
and not as a mere means of livelihood. The public is already
demanding of the legal profession more than it has been receiv-
ing. Soon it will refuse longer to endure the lawyer of no
insight into social needs and of smug provincial satisfaction with
things as they are. Even the most ignorant man now knows
that he is a citizen of the world and not merely of a province.
Now is the time for leadership possessing foresight and capac-
ity for reorganization. He only can look far into the future
who has seen far into the past. He only can reorganize wisely
whose industry has mastered the organizations of others. It is
even now the duty of the legal profession-even while our
country is in the throes of a war whose end we cannot see
but whose successful end we shall achieve-to prepare for a
scientific reorganization.
No new or sudden development is contemplated; but earnest
effort will be made to publish articles relating to international and
comparative law, legislation foreign and domestic, and every
aspect of jurisprudence. Doubtless this will mean an increase in
the size of each number published; for the JOURNAL will not
abate one jot in its efforts to cover the field it has covered in the
past, to discuss topics in the traditional branches of our American
law, to give a critical review of recent decisions in the courts.
Indeed, it is hoped to increase and improve these discussions and
to bring about a larger perspective, a greater power of analysis
and a wiser criticism because of the broader undertakings
already indicated.
The JOURNAL recognizes that legal system is not an end in
itself and that jurisprudence is but a sickly plant when cultivated
only by Professor Dryasdust. Our sole interest is in the law as
it is applied by our courts, as it is made by our legislatures, and
as it is a living force among our people. But the understanding
of the law in these practical senses requires the deeper investi-
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gation and the wider outlook. This fact must be brought home
to every practicing lawyer and to every law student. It is
believed, moreover, that this can be done most effectively, not by
publishing an additional review to be devoted exclusively to the
broader lines of legal thought and development, but, by sending
forth a well-balanced periodical that participates in all lines of
legal research, publishing the results of careful investigation in
all branches of legal theory and legal practice. To this end the
JOURNAL is dedicated; and it is hoped that the present volume
may have some modest degree of success in attaining it.
THE LAW ScHoOL.-The JOURNAL records with satisfaction
the addition of four new professors to the Law School Faculty.
One of the four, Professor Edmund M. Morgan, formerly
of the University of Minnesota faculty, has not yet assumed
his duties here, having been given leave of absence to perform
war service. He has received a commission as Judge Advocate,
with the rank of Major, in the Officers Reserve Corps and has
been detailed for service in Washington. On account of Pro-
fessor Morgan's absence the course in Court Practice which he
was to inaugurate will not be given this year.
The three other new professors have taken up their work at
Yale. Professor Ernest G. Lorenzen, also called from the
University of Minnesota, is to give courses in Sales, Damages,
Roman Law and Modern Developments, and the Comparative
Conflict of Laws.
Professor Henry W. Dunn, formerly Dean of the University
of Iowa Law School, is to give courses in Property I, Property
III and Office Practice.
Professor Edwin M. Borchard, formerly Law Librarian of
Congress and an Assistant Solicitor of the Department of State,
is to give courses in Property II, Administrative Law and Inter-
national Law. He also has charge of the Law Library.
Professor Wurts is to be away during the coming year on a
sabbatical leave of absence.
The registration of students this year is almost exactly fifty
per cent. of last year's enrollment.
THE RIGHT OF ALIEN ENEMIES TO SUE IN OUR COURTS
The question of the right of "alien enemies" to sue in muni-
cipal courts, which has frequently, since the outbreak of the war,
been presented to the English courts, has recently come up for
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decision in this country. Posselt v. D'Espard (i917, N. J. Ch.)
IOO Atl. 893.* Much of the confusion in which the general ques-
tion has been left by the courts in England and in this country
is due to the loose way in which the term "alien enemy" has
been used. The connotation of the term varies with the circum-
stances to which it is applied. With reference to naturalization,
it signifies a person having the nationality of an enemy country.
1
With reference to suits for the recovery of property or money
damages, it signifies, in the present state of Anglo-American law,
a person resident in the territory of the enemy country or adher-
ing to the enemy. This is made apparent by the purpose of the
rule, inaccurately expressed, that "alien enemies cannot sue in
the courts."
The rigorous disabilities imposed upon all aliens by the early
English law extended to their suits in court 2 The privileges
conferred upon alien merchants in general ameliorated the harsh-
ness of the law, and the alien friend, as distinguished from the
alien enemy (subject of an enemy state), was allowed to maintain
personal actions. That this right to sue was extended as an
incident to the right to trade is shown by Coke's commentary on
Littleton:
"For an alien may trade and traffique, buy and sell, and
therefore of necessity he must be of ability to have per-
sonall actions; but he cannot maintaine either real or
mixt actions."'
When we recall that, with the development of international
law, England adopted the rule that trading with the "enemy"
was prohibited during war,' and the further rule that "enemy"
character for purposes of trade is determined not by nationality
but by "trade domicil" or (in the case of individuals) by volun-
tary residence in the enemy country,5 the reason for the rule
* For complete statement of the facts see page 128, infra.
'In re Citnonian (I915, Ont. S. C.), 23 Dom. L. R. 363.
x Pollock & Maitland, History of English Law, 461.
Co. Litt. (ist Am. ed.), 129 b.
'2 Halleck, Int. Law (4th ed.), i43 et seq. Trotter, The Law of Contract
during War (London, 1914), Pt. I, sec. 9; British Trading with the Enemy
Act, 1914, 4 and 5 Geo. 5, ch. 87, and Proclamation No. 2, Sept. 9, 1914,
and Amendment October 8, 1914. U. S. Trading with the Enemy Act of
Oct. 6, 1917, sec. 3 (a). Horlock v. Beal [igi6] I A. C. 486.
5 The Pizarro (1817, U. S.), 2 Wheat. 227, 246; McConnell v. Hector
(i8o2, Eng. C. P.), 3 B. & P. 113; Tanson v. Driefontein Cons. Mines
[19o2] A. C. 484, 5o5- Ingle v. Mannheim Ins. Co. [19151 i K. B. 227.
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prohibiting "alien enemies" from suing becomes clearer. The
right to sue is in aid of the right to trade, and the prohibitions
are, in the main, parallel. The prohibition to trade with any
person, firm or corporation resident or doing business in the
enemy territory is founded on the principle of public policy
"which forbids the doing of any act which will be or 'may be to
the advantage of the enemy state by increasing its capacity for
prolonging hostilities in adding to the credit, money or goods or
other resources available to individuals in the enemy state."6
As a corollary to the above rules, it would seem that there
should be no prohibition against suit where there is no pro-
hibition to trade, or where the alien is permitted to continue to
reside unmolested. And so, indeed, has the law developed. The
state's power of expulsion of subjects of the enemy state has
not been frequently exercised in modem times,' and in England
and the United States, the modem practice, confirmed by treaty,8
has been to permit peaceable subjects of the enemy to remain,
either with express or implied license; a practice which has
introduced into the law an exception to the usual procedural
disability of the "alien enemy" in favor of those permitted to
remain sub protectione domini regis.9
An examination, in the light of these principles, of the leading
cases in which "alien enemies" were non-suited as plaintiffs,
discloses that in many of them the alien enemy was a non-
resident "alien enemy," generally resident in the enemy state.'"
These are "alien enemies," strictly speaking. In others, the
2 Westlake, Int. Law, 140; 2 Oppenheim, Int. Law, sec. 88, go; Laurent
(Gt. Brit.) v. United States, Feb. 8, 1853, Moore's Arb., 2671. Japan has
also adhered to this criterion of enemy character, but not the countries of
continental Europe, which, .with minor exceptions in Holland and Spain,
adhere to the test of nationality. 3 Fiore, sec. 1432 et seq.; 4 Calvo, sec.
1932 et seq.; Bonfils, sec. 1343 et seq.
' Lord Reading in Porter v. Freudenberg (C. A.) [1g95l i K. B. 857, 868.
See also Dicey, Conflict of Laws (2d ed.) 737.
TBorchard, Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad, 61 et seq.
'E. g. Article 23 of Treaty between the United States and Prussia, July
II, 1799, renewed May 1, 1828, 2 Malloy's Treaties, 1494, giving the respec-
tive subjects of either state in case of outbreak of war nine months to
remove their property, collect their debts, and settle their affairs.
'I Bac. Abr. (ed. 1813) 139, where it is said that the right to sue is
consequential on the right to protection.
"Brandon v. Nesbitt (794, K. B.) 6 T. R. 23; Le Bret v. Papillon
(18o4, K. B.) 4 East. 502; Daubigny v. Davallon (1795, Ex.) 2 Anstruther
462; O'Mealey v. Wilson (18o8, N. P.) i Campb. 482 (a British subject
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decision passed off on technical points of pleading.
1 1 The most
important cases involve the right of a resident subject of the
enemy state to sue, and in this matter the modern rule dates from
Wells v. Williams (1698),12 for in this case the first exception
to the disability of the alien enemy plaintiff was introduced.
Chief Justice Treby there held that an alien enemy living in
England by the King's license and under his protection may sue.
Subsequent English cases, while showing some differences of
opinion as to the party on whom rested the burden of proof of
"license" by the King
18 have, nevertheless, held with practical
uniformity that a resident alien, subject of an enemy state, who
could show that he was present with the express or implied
license of the King could sue." Such a license has been im-
plied, in the cases which have arisen since the beginning of the
war, in the system of alien registration created by the Orders
in Council under the Aliens Restriction Act, I9I4,1
5 and has
been considered as strengthened rather than weakened by intern-
ment of the "alien enemy."
6
resident in enemy territory) ; In re Wison (1915) L. J. K. B., 1893; 
Porter
v. Freudenberg (C. A.) [1915] 1 K. B. 857. Bonneau v. Dinsmore (1862,
N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 23 How. Pr. 397; Sanderson v. Morgan (1868) 
39 N. Y.
231; Seymour v. Bailey (1872) 66 Ill 288; Jackson v. Decker (1814, N. 
Y.
Sup. Ct.) ii Johns, 418; Luczycki v. Spanish River Pulp Mills (915, 
Ont.
Sup. Ct) 25 Dom. L. R. 198.
"Derrier v. Arnaud (1695, K. B.) 4 Mod. 4o5; Sylvester's Case (17o2,
Y. B.) 7 Mod. i5o; Casseresv. Bell (I799, K. B.) 8 T. R. 166; 
Society
etc. v. Wheeler (1814, U. S. C. C., N. H.) 2 Gall. iO5; Hutchinson v. 
Brock
(1814) 11 Mass. 1ig; Levine v. Taylor (1815) 12 Mass. 8.
2
1 Ld. Raym. 282.
1 Compare Casseres v. Bell (1799, K. B.) 8 T. P. 166 with Boultot; 
v.
Dobree (18o8, N. P.) 2 Camp. 163; Alciator v. Smith (1812, N. P.) 3
Camp. 245.
14 See Boulton v. Dobree, supra; Alciator v. Smith, supra; and Alcinous
v. Nigrea (1854, Q. B.) 4 E. & B. 217, where there was a failure to 
show
that the plaintiff was residing in the Kingdom with "the license, 
safe-con-
duct, or permission" of the King. See also the recent Ontario case 
of
Bassi v. Sullivan (1914, Ont. Sup. Ct) 18 Dom. L. R. 452.
" Princess Thurn and Taxis v. Mofit [1915], I Ch. 58; Porter v. Freuden-
berg (C. A.) [19151 1 K. B. 857. Hall, Int. Law (6th ed.) 388. Proclama-
tions in Canada, similar to those of England, have been held to remove the
procedural disability from alien enemies permitted to remain in residence.
Topay v. Crow's Nest Co. (1914, B. C. Sup. Ct.) 18 Dom. L. R. 
784;
Viola v. MacKenzie, Mann & Co. (1915, Que. K B.) 24 Dom. L. P. 208.
Pescovitch v. Western Can. Flour Co. (1914, Man. K. B.) 18 Dom. L. 
P_
786.
zsSchaffenius v. Goldberg [1916] 1 K. B. 284.
8
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In the United States, Chief Justice, afterwards Chancellor,
Kent, in the leading case of Clarke v. Mdrey,17 extended the
doctrine of Wells v. Williams to the conclusion that an alien
enemy who comes and resides here, even without a safe conduct
or license, is entitled to sue until ordered away by the President;
and this, too, although the party is not known by the Government
to have his residence in the United States. License is implied
from his being suffered to remain. This would seem to be the
rule most consistent with enlightened practice.
The English "Trading with the Enemy" proclamation of
September 9, 1914 (sec. 3), expressly, and the recently enacted
United States "Trading with the Enemy" Act of October 6,
1917 (sec. 2), by implication, exclude from the definition "alien
enemy" a person not resident or carrying on business within the
territory of the enemy country.
Inasmuch as, in law, the declaration of war makes enemies
of all the respective subjects of the belligerents, Vice Chancellor
Lane's attempt in the principal case to translate into a legal
distinction the political distinction made by the President between
the German Government and the German people cannot be sup-
ported. It is submitted that the German stockholders, as alien
enemies resident in the enemy state, should have been non-suited.
The question as to whether the national character of the
American corporation is affected by the majority German stock
ownership is discussed in the COMMENT following.
E.M.B.
IS AN AMERICAN CORPORATION SUBSTANTIALLY OWNED BY GERMAN
STOCKHOLDERS AN ALIEN ENEMY?
This complex problem was recently submitted to an American
court in the case of Fritz Schultz Jr. Co. v. Raimes & Co. (1917,
N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 166 N. Y. Supp. 567. There is thus raised, at a
very early stage of our participation in the Great War, the ques-
tion adjudicated in England in the celebrated Daimler case
(infra).
There are no internationally accepted rules in existence with
respect to the nationality and domicil of corporate bodies. Both
concepts, nationality and domicil, can be applied to corporations
' (1813, N. Y.) io Johns 69.
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in a metaphorical sense only.' The privileges and duties inci-
dental to allegiance and the "animus" necessary to domicil can-
not be ascribed to corporate bodies. Nevertheless, the determina-
tion of questions of taxation and jurisdiction with respect to
corporations has necessitated adjudications upon the question of
their nationality and domicil. In England it has been held that
for purposes of the provisions of the income tax law the domicil
(more accurately "residence") of a company is at the place where
its center of administration, the controlling brain, is located.'
For purposes of jurisdiction, the "domicil" has been construed
to be the place where it has a registered office, 3 and there may
indeed be two such "domicils."' 4 In the United States, the
"fiction theory" of the corporate entity has served to impute to
a corporation, for jurisdictional purposes, the citizenship of the
' Foote, Private International Jurisprudence, (4th ed.) 143 et seq.
Volumes have been written, particularly on the continent, on the debatable
question of the nationality of corporations. The various theories are well
summarized in the work of E. Hilton Young, Foreign Companies and other
Corporations, Cambridge, 1912, iio-i68. See also, Mamelok, Die juris-
tische Person in internationalen Privatrecht, Zurich, 19oo, 211 et seq.
Schwandt, Die deutschen Aktiengesellschaften, Marburg, 1912, pp. 25-75;
Pillet, Des Personnes Morales en. Droit Int. Privi, Paris, 1914; Isay, Die
Staatsaugeh6rigkeit der juristischen Personen, Tilbingen, 19o7, in which
the legislative systems of the various countries are outlined (pp. 214-224) ;
Levin, M., De la nationalitg des sociitis et ses effets juridiques, Paris, I9OO,
p. 199 et seq.; Fromageot, H., De la double nationalit6 des individus et des
socigtis, Paris, 1892, pp. 114-121; Lyon-Caen in 12 Clunet (885) 265-274;
Lain6 in 20 Clunet (1893) 273 et seq.; Arminjon in 4 Rev. de droit int.
n. s. (1902) 381 et seq., translated into English by William E. Spear, Clerk,
Spanish Treaty Claims Com., Washington, 19o7, Document 53; Marais and
Barclay in 23rd Report, International Law Assn. (19o6) 36o-372; Jacobi
in 27th Rep. ibid., 368-380; Baumgarten in 28th Rep. ibid., 246-254. The
various theories relating to the nationality of corporations are summarized
in Borchard, Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad, 617-618.
' Calcutta Jute Mills v. Nicholson (1876) 1 Ex. D. 428. De Beers Cons.
Mines v. Howe (C. A.) [1905] 2 K. B. 612; [19o6] A. C. 455. Goers v.
Bell r19o41 2 K. B. 136; Mitchell v. Egyptian Hotels, Ltd. [1915] A. C.
1022, 1037; San Paulo Ry. Co. v. Carter [1896] A. C. 31. See an excellent
article by E. J. Schuster in (1917) Papers read before the Grotius Society,
vol. II, p. 57.
'Keynshan, etc., Co. v. Baker (1863, Ex.) 2 H. & C. 729.
'Carron Iron Co. v. Maclaren (1855) 5 H. L. C. 416, 449 and analysis of
that case by Prof. Wesley N. Hohfeld, The Individual Liability of Stock-
holders and the Conflict of Laws (191o) 10 COLUMBIA L. Rv. 319.
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state in which it was incorporated, 5 although this conclusion was
subsequently rested upon the further fiction that there is merely
"an indisputable legal presumption that a state corporation . . .
is composed of the citizens of the state which created it."O
The persuasiveness and apparent simplicity of the "fiction
theory" of the corporation have led the English courts to hold
that the nationality of a corporation is to be deemed that of the
country in which it was incorporated, regardless of its center
of administration, 7 and, most curiously, regardless of the fact
that for belligerent purposes domicil, and not nationality, is the
test of enemy character." Consistently with this theory they
have declined to investigate the nationality of the stockholders,
as a matter which could not affect the nationality of the corpora-
tion.' Lord Macnaghten in the Janson case (arising out of the
Boer war), in which a company incorporated in the Transvaal
was largely owned by British stockholders, stated:
"If all its members had been subjects of the British
Crown, the corporation itself would have been none the
less a foreign corporation and none the less in regard
to this country an alien."'"
Louisville, Cinci., etc., R. R. v. Letson (1844, U. S.) 2 How. 497, 555.
This is the theory followed by Lehman J. in the principal case in deciding
that the New Jersey corporation had the right to sue.
6St. Louis and San Francisco Ry. v. James (1896) 161 U. S. 545, 562.
'Attorney General v. Jewish, etc., Assn. [19OO] 2 Q. 3. 556; [1901] i
Q. 3. x23.
'Amorduct Mfg. Co. v. Defries (915) 84 L. J. K. B. 586; Janson v.
Driefontein Cons. Mines, Ltd. [19o2] A. C. 484. Daimler v. Continental
Tyre Co. (C. A.) [1915] I K. B. 893. (But see notes 12-14.)
'Janson v. Driefontein Cons. Mines, Ltd. [1902] A. C. 484; Amorduct
Mfg. Co. v. Defries, supra. The Roumanian [1915] P. 26. In the
matter of ownership of British ships (under the Merchant Shipping
Act)-such ships cannot be owned by aliens-the courts until recently
adhered to the fiction theory of the corporate entity. Queen v. Arnaud
(1846) 6 L. J. Q. B. (n. s.) 5o. (Lord Denman, C. J.: "In no legal sense
are the individual members [of the corporation] the owners.") Recently,
however, they have in this matter refused to be bound by the mere incor-
poration in England as conferring British nationality upon a corporation
(and thus upon a ship) substantially owned by alien (German) stock-
holders, where the ship was under the control of the alien owners. The
Polzeath [1916] P. 117 (C. A.) 241; Dictum in The Tornmi [1914] P. 251.
Compare, in the United States, Hastings v. Anacortes Packing Co. (1902)
29 Wash. 224.
J Janson v. Driefontein Cons. Mines, Ltd. [19o2] A. C. 484, 497.
IIO
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The principle was carried to its logical, if somewhat startling,
conclusion by the Court of Appeal in the Daimler case," in which
Lord Reading held that a company incorporated in England,
only one of whose 25,000 shares was owned by a British subject,
the balance being owned in Germany, was a British company and
entitled to sue in a British court.1 2 This decision was reversed
in the House of Lords13 on another ground, so that the opinions
of the law lords on the question of the nationality of the plaintiff
company are dicta only. Nevertheless, they will carry, great
weight by reason of the authority of the judges delivering them.
Of the eight judges, two (Lord Shaw and Lord Parmoor) fol-
lowed Lord Reading's decision in the Court of Appeal, although
Lord Parmoor would, on evidence that the business of the com-
pany was carried on in an enemy country, have held otherwise.
The Earl of Halsbury took the view that the company had an
enemy character if the whole or a large part of its capital were
owned by persons residing or doing business in Germany. He
was the only one of the fourteen judges who sat in the two appel-
late courts who, it is submitted, consciously declined to be mis-
led by the fiction theory, but concluded that a corporation was
merely a form of association, analogous to a partnership, to
enable human beings to do business and enjoy their property."
"Daimler v. Continental Tyre Co. (C. A.) [19151 I K. B. 893. (Four
of the justices concurred, Buckley, L. J., now Lord Wrenbury, alone
dissenting on what would seem intuitive rather than legal grounds.)
"' The decision was substantially aided by the Trading with the Enemy
Proclamation of Sept. 9, 1914, which provides (§3) that "In the case of
incorporated bodies, enemy character attaches only to those incorporated in
an enemy country." A less restrictive but similar provision is included in
the United States Trading with the Enemy Act of October 6, 1917 (§2a).
Although the British Proclamation substitutes nationality for domicil in
determining enemy character, it is proper to recall that in Anglo-American
law the nationality and domicil of corporations are usually considered
identical. Subsequent British Orders in Council and the Trading with the
Enemy Amendment Act, 1916 (5 and 6 Geo. V, c. Io5) have extended the
prohibition of trading with the enemy very widely to include those having
"enemy association" (which has been construed by the political department
of the Government to include firms even in neutral countries having Ger-
man sympathies, connections or trade relations) and give the Board of
Trade wide powers to wind up British concerns with such association.
See Frank Evans: Trading with the Enemy Amendment Act, 1916 (1916)
32 LAW QuAR. Ray., 249.
18 [1916] 2 A. C. 307.
"An able analysis of the fiction theory of the "corporate entity" show-
ing its true relations to legal realities is to be found in an article by
II1
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The opinions of the other judges, as expressed by Lord Parker,
while purporting to uphold the legal entity theory, in fact laid
particular emphasis upon the actual control and directing center
of management as the determining factor in reaching a conclu-
sion as to enemy character; and on this point, while the nation-
ality of the shareholders could not affect the nationality of the
company, they considered the character of the stockholders
material to the question whether the control of the company's
business was in fact vested in persons adhering to or under the
control of enemies.
1 5
While unwilling to modify in any way the corporate entity
theory, Lehman, J., in the principal case, nevertheless adopted
so much of Lord Parker's dictum as touched upon the question
of "control" of the corporation by persons resident in an enemy
country or adhering to the enemy, concluding that inasmuch as
three of the four directors, including the manager, were resi-
dents of this country, the company was not under the "control"
of alien enemies.16 Thus, by the organization of subsidiary com-
panies, with local directors in ostensible control, it would seem
possible for large corporations doing an international business, to
minimize the effects of an eventual taint of enemy character-a
result created by the courts through their hesitation in piercing
the corporate veil.
In conclusion, it may be observed that International Claims
Commissions have almost uniformly adopted the rule, for pur-
poses of jurisdiction, that the nationality of corporations is that
of their country of incorporation, although the Department of
Professor Wesley N. Hohfeld: Nature of Stockholders' Individual Lia-
bility for Corporation Debts (igo) 9 COLUmBIA L. REV. 285, 288 et seq.
For cases in which the "fiction theory" (under statutory construction) has
been discarded see the Australian cases of Osborne v. The Commonwealth
(iI) 12 Commonw. L. R. 321, 365; and Morgan v. Deputy Federal
Comm. (1912) 15 Commonw. L. R. 661. A leading extreme case supporting
the corporate entity theory is that of Salomon v. Salomon & Co. EI897]
A. C. 22.
15 [I916] 2 A. C. 307, 344. Story, J., in the case of Society etc. v. Wheeler
(814, U. S. C. C., N. H.) 2 Gall. xO5, a case much misunderstood,
really decided that the courts could determine the character of the British
corporation from the character, enemy or friendly, of its members.
" It should be observed that in England, one-third stock ownership in
an English company by subjects of the enemy suffices to give the Board
of Trade supervision of its affairs, and some similar rule will undoubtedly
be adopted by the Alien Property Custodian in the United States. A




State, acting administratively, always seeks, before extending
protection to American corporations abroad, to establish the fact
that the substantial beneficial ownership of the company is vested
in American stockholders.1
CONFLICT OF LAWS IN WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LEGISLATION.
A recent Connecticut case involves problems in the conflict
of laws that are at once of compelling theoretical interest and
of great practical importance. An employee under a Massachu-
setts contract was injured in Connecticut while at work within the
scope of his employment. Under the decision of the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Gould's Case', in accordance
with the court's conclusion as to legislative intent, the Work-
men's Compensation Act of Massachusetts has no application
to an injury occurring outside of that jurisdiction. In an action
brought in Connecticut recovery was allowed under the statute
of the latter state. Douthwright v. Champlin (1917) 91 Conn.
524; 100 Atl. 97.
Such a result would have been reached without difficulty under
the authority of Gould's Case, supra. This case, mainly on con-
siderations applicable to the law of torts generally, while decid-
itig that the Massachusetts act did not apply to extraterritorial
injuries, expressly stated that it did apply to all intraterritorial
injuries irrespective of the place of the contract. The court
gave full effect to the presumption that a legislative act designed
partially to supersede a particular branch of the law of torts
is coextensive in application with the law thus superseded.2 The
fact that this dominant purpose was effected by reading certain
unexpressed terms into certain contracts of employment was
deemed not to affect this presumption. The rule of conflict of
laws applicable to torts generally,3 and not that applicable to
contracts, was therefore consistently applied.
17 Borchard, op. cit., pp. 620-626.
1 (1913) 215 Mass. 480, 1o2 N. E. 693. Accord, Tomalin v. Pearson,
[1909] 2 K. B. 61; Schwartz v. India Rubber, etc. Co. [1912] 2 K. B. 299.
Applying the principle of Gould's Case to the question of waiver of com-
mon law rights are Johnson v. Nelson (1915) 128 Minn. 158, 15o N. W.
620; Piatt v. Smith (915) 188 Mo. App. 584, 176 S. W. 434; Pendar v.
H. & B. Mach. Co. (1913) 35 R. I. 321, 87 AtI. i.
'Gould's Case, supra, 487.
See cases cited in Gould's Case, 487; and compare the very important
case of Brown v. Western Union Tel. Co. (1914) 234 U. S. 542, 547, 34
Sup. Ct. 955, 956.
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Such, however, was not the reasoning of the principal case.
It had previously been decided 4 that the Compensation Act of
Connecticut was in effect an amendment of contract law, in its
dominant characteristic a rule of construction applicable to a
special class of contracts, whereby certain so-called "implied"
terms were added. Accordingly the act was held to apply to
all injuries wherever occurring, if arising under Connecticut
contracts of employment, with the further intimation5 that a
similar application would be accorded to foreign acts in case
of injuries occurring within Connecticut under foreign contracts.
This, now probably the prevailing view among the states,6 while
recognized as law by the principal case, was refused application
on the ground that the jurisdiction of the contract had, under
Gould's Case, no applicable compensation act.1
We are not now concerned as between the two opposing
theories of the workmen's compensation acts. The issue
between them is merely one of degree. All rules of contract law,
properly speaking, are ultimately concerned with the modification
of certain conditions non-contractual in character. Conversely
many rules of law, plainly within the domain of tort or quasi-
contract law, obtain their compulsory fulfillment through the
prohibition of certain terms in certain contracts. In no case is
the mere regulation of the contractual relationship as such the
sole and ultimate purpose of legislation." In any case a regulation
partaking of the nature of tort law may involve the incidental
modification of the construction of certain contracts.9 The
decisive question should be, therefore: what is the dominant
purpose of the statute,-to abolish certain unspecified evils
arising from a certain way of contracting, the latter being the
direct object of legislative attack, or to remedy certain factual
conditions directly selected as the object of remedial legislation,
with only an incidental effect upon contract law?
"Kennerson v. Thames Towboat Co. (,9,5) 89 Conn. 367, 94 At. 372.
1 Ibid., 89 Conn. 381, 94 At. 378.
'Post v. Burger (1916) 216 N. Y. 544, iir N. E. 35,; Schweitzer v.
Hamburg-Amerikanische, etc. Co. (1912, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 78 Misc. (N. Y.)
448, 138 N. Y. Supp. 944; Grinnell v. Wilkinson (igi6, R. I.) 98 AtI. lO3;
Gooding v. Ott (1916, W. Va.) 87 S. E. 862. See also Bradbury, Work-
ingmen's Compensation (2d ed.) 56.
TSee principal case, 91 Conn. 528-529, ioo At. 98.
"E. g., statutes of frauds, and regulations of life insurance contracts.
'E. g., regulations of hours of labor.
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A graver practical question, however, is here involved. Can
a court, consistently with the principles of conflict of laws,
presume that an act combines both these characteristics simul-
taneously? Can it extend its own act to extraterritorial injuries
occurring under contracts made within its own jurisdiction, and
incorporate by reference foreign acts,10 if applicable, as a part
of the law of the contract in cases of intraterritorial injuries
under foreign contracts, on the one hand, and, on the other hand,
apply its own act to intraterritorial injuries under foreign
contracts when the lex contractus has no applicable statute pro-
viding compensation, and also give effect to the law of the
place of injury irrespective of the law of the contract in the
matter of statutory waiver of common law rights of action? No
conclusive theoretical objection to such a position exists, as the
legislative intention may be deemed to have embraced both
objects in equal degree. Such, indeed, has become the settled
doctrine of at least one state.1"
But the principles of conflict of laws are designed to provide
a method of selection of specific rules universally applicable
to specific groups of facts, without variation dependent upon the
place where the remedy is sought.1 2  The rule under present
consideration must stand or fall according as it, if consistently
followed, subserves this end; for, whatever the legislatures might
have done by express enactment, they should not be presumed
to have acted in contravention of the objects for which rules of
conflict of laws exist.1 3 We may assume any of the following
" For the logical and legal bases of the conflict of laws, more particularly
as regards "incorporation by reference," see Professor Wesley N.
Hohfeld, The Individual Liability of Stockholders and the Conflict of
Laws (x9o9) 9 COL. L. REv. 496, 520, 522, note, and 1o COL. L. REv. 526;
see also Comment entitled Moratorium Decrees and the Conflict of Laws
(1917) 26 YALE LAW JOuRllNAL, 771, 772.
"Except that the tort or quasi-contract aspect of the statute has been
carried so far as to embrace intra-territorial injuries, even though the
foreign lex contractus was an applicable statute. Am. Radiator Co. v.
Rogge (I94) 86 N. J. L. 436, 92 Atl. 85, 93 Atl. io83, 94 At. 85; Rounsa-
vile v. Central R. Co. (,9,5, Sup. Ct) 87 N. J. L. 371, 374; At. 392, 393
(applying the contract theory). Also compare Pendar v. H. & B. Mach.
Co., supra, with Grinnell v. Wilkinson, supra.
" See Pillet,. Essai d'un .ystime giniral de solution des conflicts des
lois (1894) 21 Clunet 417, 7,1; also Comment, Moratorium Decrees and
the Conflict of Laws (9,7) 26 YALE LAW JouRNA ., 771, 773.
'In re Wood (19o2) 137 Cal. 129, 69 Pac. 9oo; N. Y. Mut. Life Ins. Co.
v. Prewitt (907) 127 Ky. 399, 1o5 S. W. 463.
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alternative hypotheses, with respect to states X and Y. First,
an injury occurs in state X under a Y contract of employment,
the injury being of such a nature as to come within the terms
of the X statute and not within the terms of the Y statute.
Second, the injury comes within the terms of both statutes but
with different scales of compensation. Third, state Y has no
applicable workmen's compensation act. Fourth, under the
law of state Y there has been no waiver of common law rights
of action, while under the law of state X there has been such a
waiver. Upon the fundamental assumption that the X statute
is a branch of the contract law of state X, it necessarily follows
that the failure to enact a similar statute in state Y is equally
a characteristic of the contract law of the latter state. The
absence of an applicable statute, therefore, and the provision of
a different scale of compensation, and the rule resulting in no
waiver of common law rights are as decisive features of the
law of the contract as any positive applicable provision would be.
To refuse to give effect to them, by swinging over to the tort
theory of the local act, is in direct violation of the principles of
international reciprocity applicable to contract law.
If it should be urged that such a policy is in accord with the
well-settled rule1 ' that the lex contractus will not be incor-
porated by reference when contrary to the declared public
policy of the forum, two answers may be made. First, it has
been decided,' 5 and the result seems incontestable on principle,
that contracts made under common law rules of industrial acci-
dent liability do not fall within such a classification. Second,
the assumption of the existence of such a rule of policy estab-
lished by the local statute is precisely the position which we
contend to be incompatible with the simultaneous assumption
that the legislation falls within the category of contract law.
It is immaterial that a similar practical result is reached when,
as sometimes unavoidably happens, different rules of conflict
of laws obtain acceptance in different jurisdictions, or when
different notions of public morals require a forum to repudiate a
contract valid under the law of the contract. Our suggestions
are directed to the fact that the court has in the present instance
raised a gratuitous presumption of legislative intention intrinsic-
ally leading to this exceptional result.
"4Greenwood v. Curtis (i8io) 6 Mass. 358.
" Reynolds v. Day (914) 79 Wash. 499, 140 Pac. 681.
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We have seen that a consistent application of the doctrine of
the principal case has already produced an actual overlapping of
the positive provisions of two compensation statutes.16 Such a
result has not yet been reached under the law of the principal
case.1 7  It would, however, logically follow from a refusal to
recognize the negative features of the law of the contract on a
point assumed to be one of contract law.
We submit, therefore, that the decision in the principal case
should be reached under the reasoning of Gould's Case, supra,
or not at all, and that the courts should decisively elect between
the theory of that case and the contract theory of the workmen's
compensation acts. If the latter prevails, the place of injury
should in all cases be immaterial, whether or not the jurisdiction
of the contract happens to possess an applicable statute.
C. R. W.
EXTRATERRITORIAL RECOGNITION OF A DECREE OF
JUDICIAL SEPARATION
For the first time, apparently, a court has passed upon the
extraterritorial effect, in a subsequent action for full divorce,
of an ex parte judicial separation.1 Pettis v. Pettis (1917) 91
Conn. 6o8, lOI Atl. 13. Immediately after marriage in New
York the parties had separated; the wife remained resident
there and obtained the decree in question. When the husband,
who was domiciled throughout in Connecticut, began suit for
divorce on grounds of desertion she pleaded the decree, which
was based on cruelty, to justify her living apart. The court
held that a decree of judicial separation, as opposed to full
divorce, did not affect the marriage status, was personal in its
nature, and to be in any way effective in another State, called
for personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
If such a decree from bed and board is indeed personal merely,
it cannot of course be enforced abroad against a non-appearing,
non-resident party; nor can it be res judicata as to the grounds
16 See note ii, supra.
1TSee principal case, 91 Conn. 528, ioo Ati. 98.
'Where both parties have been before the court, the decree will bar
subsequent suit by the original defendant for divorce on grounds of
desertion; and is conclusive as to the issues of fact on which it is based.
Harding v .Harding (x9o5) I98 U. S. 317, 25 Sup. Ct. R. 679.
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on which it was based.2  Doubt may well be entertained, how-
ever, whether such a decree does not sufficiently affect the mar-
riage status to be considered, in the same way as that of divorce
proper, a decree in rem. This marriage status cannot be literally
a res, a thing physical; it is rather the condition of the parties
in society, the sum of their jural relations with each other and
with people at large: their rights, powers, disabilities," etc. Now
with judicial separation, as with divorce, the wife loses what
disabilities marriage imposed upon her4 : she may now acquire
and hold personal property in her own right5 ; she may convey
realty, sue, be sued.8 The decree may fix her property rights
and those of her husband. His control over her and his right
of cohabitation he has lost.8 Has he not then likewise lost his
rights against all men that they do not alienate his wife's
affections which are no longer his; or interfere with the con-
sortium he no longer enjoys? With the right of cohabitation
he has at least lost the duty to support his wife;"O with this
2Pennoyer v. Neff (1877) 95 U. S. 714.
'When married women's property acts cut away perhaps the major por-
tion of these relations, the in rem character of proceedings directed
"against" the status grew considerably more shadowy than it was when
established in Ditson v. Ditson (1856) 4 R. I. 87.
'To this an exception ought perhaps to be made as to the power of
either party to dispose of real estate acquired before the decree. Castle-
bury v. Maynard (1886) 95 N. C. 281. But see Marshall v. Baynes (1892)
88 Va. 1040, 14 S. E. 978.
'Meehan v. Meehan (1848 N. Y.) 2 Barb. 377.
'Delafield v. Brady (1888) io8 N. Y. 524, 15 N. E. 428; Barber v.
Barber (1858 U. S.) 21 How. 582.
See Davis v. Davis (1878) 75 N. Y. 221. In Thompson v. Thompson
(1913) 226 U. S. 551, 33 Sup. Ct R. i29, a Maryland decree from bed
and board was held to blot out the wife's claim to maintenance and her
rights in her husband's property.
SPeople v. Cullen (1897) 153 N. Y. 629, 635, 636, 47 N. E. 894; and see
American Legion v. Smith (i889) 45 N. J. Eq. 466, 17 AtI. 770. That
cohabitation in the broad sense involves a right as well as a privilege is
shown by the remedy granted in case of desertion.
'Barrere v. Barrere (3839, N. Y.) 4 Johns. Ch. 187, i96, squints in pass-
ing toward the persistence of this set of rights. The problem all through
here is whether the possibility of reconciliation would be sufficient to
found an action; ordinarily such reconciliation would appear not only
contingent, but improbable. In any case, the right to compensation for
loss of consortium is fading. Feneff v. R. R. Co. (igog) 203 Mass. 278;
89 N. E. 436.
, Unless it is expressly imposed upon him. People v. Cullen, supra.
Contra, State v. Ellis (898) 5o La. Ann. 559; 23 So. R. 445; but the
court in the principal case was considering a New York decree.
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latter it would seem as if her power to pledge his credit for
necessaries must also fall.1 Further, if no alimony has been
decreed, it is not easy to see how the husband's death by the
wrongful act of another can any longer found an action by his
wife.12 Even the power to reestablish the old status must be
exercised through a decree of the court;" it is hardly to be
distinguished from divorcees' powers to remarry each other. The
New York judicial separation, in fact, seems to leave very little
of the marriage status save a duty in each party not to commit
adultery14 and the incapacity of either to contract a valid marriage
with another person;' 5 while even this last is matched in the
case of the guilty party by like incapacity after full divorce.
6
Still, though in pure theory we concede to the decree from bed
and board an effect "quasi" in rem, there are considerations
of public policy to be urged against its being so regarded in
practice. In the case of divorce a vinculo, though constitutional
compulsion extends only to decrees obtained in the matrimonial
domicile,' 7 public policy requires an ex parte proceeding at the
,Such power in the wife is decidedly founded on the husband's duty of
support; will it stand without its foundation? Erkenbach v. Erkenbach
(1884) 96 N. Y. 456, 465, suggests that it may still continue.
"Statutes confer this right for the purpose of making up to mentioned
relatives the entire pecuniary loss resulting from the deceased's death.
Murphy v. N. Y. C. R. R. (1882) 88 N. Y. 445, basing on the N. Y. Code
sec. 19o2 ff. But unless the .wife be entitled to support, what pecuniary
loss does she sustain? It is held, Countryman v. Fonda etc. R. R. Co.
(igoi) i66 N. Y. 2o, 2o8 f., 59 N. E. 822, that the jury may consider pro-
spective damages beyond what they might at common law; would the
wife's damage in the supposed case be even prospective?
"Bliss' Ann. N. Y. Code sec. 1767.
"As shown by the fact that breach of the duty by either would ground a
bill by the other for a complete divorce. Vischer v. Vischer (i85i, N. Y.)
12 Barb. 640.
"To these should be added a joint power, legal as well as physical, to
produce legitimate children. Barrere v. Barrere, supra, indicates a pre-
sumption, prima facie only, against the legitimacy of children born under
such circumstances.
" It is worth thought in this connection that this last, this species of
"marital celibacy," although decreed by a court having jurisdiction of the
person, against one of *ts own citizens, and although surely intended to
affect status, will be given no recognition extraterritorially. Van Voorhis
v. Brintnall (1881) 86 N. Y. 18; In re Crane (912) 170 Mich. 65i, I36
N. W. 587. But cf. Hall v. Industrial Commission (1917, Wis.) 162 N. W.
312, discussed p. 131 infra.
'Haddock v. Haddock (i9o6) 201 U. S. 562, 26 Sup. Ct. R. 525, as
interpreted in Thompson v. Thompson, supra.
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domicile of either spouse to be treated as in rem.1 8  There is
need for certainty in the matters of legitimacy, bigamy, adultery.
People are best everywhere married, or everywhere not. There
seems to be no such urgent call to recognize in like manner
decrees manufacturing states of part- or almost-marriage, dis-
tinct each one according to the law of the jurisdiction where
its particular decree of limited divorce happened to be granted.
Thus in the principal case the court assimilated the parties' status
to that nearest like it known to the law of Connecticut: marriage.
On the other hand, this use of the judicial separation decree as
purely personal leads to difficulty to which the court is sensible:
because it did not affect status, recognition is denied to a decree
which the New York court could not have rendered ex parte,
had they not held it in some sort in rem, precisely because it did
affect status.' 9
But though we admit it to be so to speak in rem, it still does not
follow that the decree of judicial separation would have served
the purpose for which it was introduced. It was not pleaded
in bar; it seems to have been intended to establish against the
husband the cruelty on which it was based.20 But ex parte
divorce decrees seem to be anomalous-if they are in rem in
truth-in that they swim-free and have effect, though the neces-
sary grounds on which they base sink away; in that they need
not even bar further divorce proceedings by the original defend-
ant. So an ex parte divorce judgment has been held not to
estop the wife from showing that her husband had committed
acts entitling her to alimony and divorce, and that she committed
N w York and a few other States do not admit this. See Haddock v.
Haddock, supra, dissenting opinion of Brown, J. And elsewhere limita-
tions are imposed: as, not recognizing jurisdiction in the divorcing court
unless the defendant receive actual notice. Felt v. Felt (1899) 59 N. J. Eq.
.606, 45 Atl. io5; and cf. Perkins v. Perkins (ig6) 225 Mass. 82, 113
N. E. 841.
"'To answer that the status concerned is not the same in the two cases;
i. e., that a wife's marital status may be affected materially without chang-
ing that of her husband, leads into a metaphysical labyrinth. But cf. the
language in Haddock v. Haddock, supra; in Perkins v. Perkins, supra;
and in the principal case.
Though not included in the pleadings either to the husband's action
for desertion or in the wife's cross-action for cruelty, the record was
admitted in evidence without objection. The wife's task was to justify
leaving her husband on the very day of the wedding; the decree could
lhelp in that only so far as it concluded him on the point of cruelty.
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none to either bar alimony or ground divorce.2 And, throwing
theory to all the winds of heaven in the interests of justice,
courts have, without wishing to "impugn" the prior decree,
granted new divorce to an already divorced wife, because with-
out it the ancillary decree of alimony could not be rendered.2
Whether, therefore, the ex parte decree of judicial separation
be, as here held, in personam merely, 2 3-because it does not in
fact affect status, or because it seems more advantageous to act as
if it did not; or whether, as fully as divorce a vinculo, it finally
achieve extraterritorial recognition-in either case the finding of
fact on which it is based seems destined, unlike the prophet, to
honor only in its own country.
K. N. L.
AN EXPANSION OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE: FEDERAL SUPREME
COURT REVIEW OF ERRORS IN THE APPLICATION OF STATE LAWS
Since our Federal Supreme Court, in its interpretation of the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment,' is committed
to the policy of waiting for cases 2 rather than that of binding
itself in advance with a definite rule, each new decision on this
subject from that learned body is likely to contain points and
reasoning of more than ordinary moment. Three cases recently
decided are here to be considered together in so far as their
differences will permit.
Mississippi Railroad Commission v. Mobile & Ohio Railroad
(1917) 37 Sup. Ct. 602, is a case of attempted railroad regulation
which was defeated by the decision of the United States courts.
The state commission is an elected branch of the executive
department.3 It held the legally required hearings in this matter,
considered the evidence presented by the railroad and others and
" Thurston v. Thurston (1894) 58 Minn. 279, quoted at length and
approved, Toncray v. Toncray (igio) 123 Tenn 476, 31 S. W. 977. It is,
however, difficult to make out just which marriage relations those are,
which the court there holds to have been "seized" by the foreign ex parte
divorce.
'For proceedings in rein and in personam cf. (917) 26 YALE LAW
JouRNAL 710, 759-764.
= Turner v. Turner (87o) 44 Ala. 437; Stilohen v. Stilphen (187o)
58 Me. 5o8.
"Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law."
"'The process of judicial inclusion and exclusion," Davidson v. New
Orleans (1877) 96 U. S. 97, 104.
" Miss. Code i9o6, see. 4826.
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thereafter ordered the reinstatement of numerous local passenger
trains recently taken off between Meridian and certain less im-
portant points. When the railroad filed a bill to enjoin the
enforcement of this order it appeared that under capable man-
agement the road was operating at a considerable deficit at that
time and further, that some, although not remarkably convenient,
service was still offered between the towns. The Supreme Court
declared that a fair rate of return must be allowed, otherwise
a commission's ruling would be altogether unreasonable and its
enforcement a violation of due process. And so it was here.
A second case, Saunders v. Shaw (i917) 37 Sup. Ct. 638,
probably involves a more novel state of facts. Here a landowner
in his suit to enjoin collection of a special drainage assessment
levied against him in Louisiana, offered evidence to show that
he received no benefit from the improvement. The trial court
ruled out this evidence as incompetent but permitted it, as well
as some evidence of the defendant drainage board, to be spread
upon the record for use by the Supreme Court on appeal. The
trial judge did not permit cross-examination, however; and,
in view of its ruling which rejected the landowner's evidence,
an intervenor, who held bonds payable from this tax, offered no
evidence in rebuttal. There was judgment below against the
landowner, which was first affirmed by the Supreme Court of
Louisiana but on rehearing, on account of a subsequent decision
of the United States Supreme Court,4 was reversed without
remanding, 5-- the Louisiana Court probably feeling satisfied of
the facts on inspecting those which were before it in the record
and only changing position on the point of law, namely, as to
whether benefit to the land assessed was material. On the
appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the intervenor con-
tended that he had been given no opportunity to present his
evidence (since it would have been an idle procedure to attempt
to answer that of the landowner which had been rejected by the
trial court). In this contention he was upheld; he had not been
given due process of law.
A third case also presenting a novel point is Chicago Life
Insurance Company v. Cherry (1917) 37 Sup. Ct. 492. Two
insurance companies being sued in Tennessee but not served there,
'Myles Salt Co. v. Iberia & St. M. Drainage Dist. (i915) 239 U. S.
478; 36 Sup. Ct. 2o4.
5Shaw v. Board of Comnrs. (i9r6) 138 La. 917, 7o So. 9IO.
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nevertheless contested the jurisdiction of the trial court by a
plea in abatement and lost in both the lower and the supreme
court of that state, judgment being given for the plaintiff. Suit
on the judgment was later brought in Illinois where, in the
Superior Court of Cook County, the plaintiff once more had
judgment. On appeal the Illinois Appellate Court refused to
look further into the question of jurisdiction in Tennessee than
to note that the issue had been raised, argued and considered
in the courts of that state before judgment was given there.6
Two lines of reasoning are followed by the United States
Supreme Court in affirming the Illinois Appellate Court in this
decision.
The first considers the question of jurisdiction in Tennessee
as if the case had come up from there without a trip to Illinois.
If the Tennessee court did not have personal jurisdiction of the
insurance companies it clearly could not issue a valid judgment
against them.7 On the other hand if there had been personal
service on the defendants in Tennessee, jurisdiction would of
course have been established. There seems to be no well settled
rule as to the exact point between these two extreme states of
fact at which the line is drawn. The United States Court recog-
nizes that a difference of opinion on the subject is possible and
reasonable as well and regards as not lacking in due process a
rule that the mere filing of a plea in abatement gives the court
jurisdiction.8
The second line of reasoning to uphold the Illinois court
amounts briefly to this: A decision rendered in good faith by
a state court although predicated on a mistake of fact will
ordinarily give the defeated party no ground of appeal under
the fourteenth amendment of the Federal Constitution. To Illi-
nois courts Tennessee law is a matter of fact and hence the rule
applies in this case.9
It should be recalled in considering these cases that the meaning
of the phrase, "due process of law" has in the United States
" Cherry v. Chicago Life Ins. Co. (1914) i9o Ill. App. 7o.
TPennoyer v. Neff (1877) 95 U. S. 714; Scott v. McNeal (1893) '54
U. S. 34, 46; 14 Sup. Ct. 1o8, III2 (administration upon the estate of a
supposed decedent).
'Equally unobjectionable whether provided by statute or by a court.
*Similarly held where a state court is in error on a point of conflict
of laws. Kryger v. Wilson (i916) 242 U. S. I71, 37 Sup. Ct. 34; see Com-
ment, Due Process and Full Faith and Credit clauses as applied to the
Conflict of Laws (917) 26 YALE LAw JouRNAL 405.
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been expanded so as to include not only process in the everyday
meaning, process-proper, but the result or outcome of that process,
the decision or judgment handed down.'0 It should also be
recalled that the application of the limitation has been extended
to embrace the legislative" and judicial departments of our
government, including the inferior bodies and officers of each.1
2
The railroad commission in Mississippi was one of these
inferior bodies. The case may be classified as one containing
a mistake of law and a resulting unreasonable regulation."
It may then serve as a background for the others.
The two remaining cases are judicial appeals. Where the act
of a court is in question it has been stated upon high authority
that an erroneous decision, simply, is not a violation of the due
process clause in the fourteenth amendment. That the rule is
not applicable to the quasi judicial acts of executive bodies is
evidenced by the railroad case just considered, there having been
no charge of bad faith on the part of the commission. The
principal importance of the Louisiana and Illinois cases would
seem to consist in showing that the rule is not always and
absolutely applicable to judicial decisions either. In other words,
they recognize that certain kinds of errors, even by a court rela-
tive to its own law, may be denials of due process. One of the
cases does this by suggestion; the other seems to decide just that.
For a number of years dicta, and to some extent decisions, have
been approaching this point from various angles. The progress
"Whether anything turns on the distinction between "process-proper"
and result it is difficult to say. A close case may some day bring the dis-
tinction into prominence but at present no statement can be made with
assurance. See Harlan, J., in Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. v. Chicago (1897)
I66 U. S. 226, 234-235, 17 Sup. Ct 581, 584, col. I.
"On the total lack of meaning of the phrase when applied to the legis-
lature without the expanded interpretation, see Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations, p. 503.
"Ex parte Virginia (1879) 1oo U. S. 339, 346. That the amendment is
intended even to cover cases where the state agents act in excess of, or
in violation of state law, see, Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886) 118 U. S. 356,
6 Sup. Ct io64.
"Mistake of law because it appears that the Commission computed
railroad service expense on the actual "out of pocket" cost, this rule of
computation being held to be wrong.
"Chief Justice Waite in Arrowsmith v. Harmoning (i86) II8 U. S.
194, i95; 6 Sup. Ct io23, io24. See also, Patterson v. Colorado (i9o7) 2o5
U. S. 454, 460, 27 Sup. Ct. 556, 557. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations,
p. 587.
COMMENTS
may be set forth as a series of steps. Numerous dicta may be
found to the effect that fraudulent decisions or those rendered in
bad faith are wanting in due process and may be carried to the
United States Supreme Court for that reason.
15 Likewise it has
been stated that due process of law requires a competent and
impartial tribunal. 8 In one case whose facts were widely aired
in the press"1 the dissenting opinion
8 declared that a criminal
trial before a mob-controlled tribunal is not due process of law,
which general rule seems to have been recognized as well by
the majority. A very definite step in this general direction was
taken in the case of Scott v. McNeal,
9 in which the United States
Supreme Court reversed the State Supreme Court of Wash-
ington on the question of jurisdiction in a lower court of that
state. At that time it is hardly likely that the state court would
have been reversed on a question of procedure in the lower court,
once the jurisdiction of the latter was established.0 And yet
that is the point to which the decision in Saunders v. Shaw now
carries us.
This result has been foreshadowed, not only by analogy as
outlined above, but directly in the language of the Justices. It has
been intimated that extraordinary cases might arise in which 
a
state would deprive a person of due process of law solely by
the decision of its courts.
2 Just such an intimation is found in
the Life Insurance case now before us, but neither therein nor in
the previous cases was the required grossly erroneous decision
thought to be present. It did arrive when a court rendered a
decision which concluded a case without any evidence by one of
the parties.
'Fallbrook Irrig. Dist. v. Bradley (1896) 64 U. S. 112, 17 Sup. Ct. 56.
Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minnesota (i8go) '34 U. S. 418, 466, xo Sup.
Ct. 462.
'Jordan v. Mass. (92) 225 U. S. 167, i76, 32 Sup. Ct. 651.
'"Frank v. Mangum (915) 237 U. S. 309, 35 Sup. Ct 582.
'That of Holmes, J.; Hughes, J., concurred in the dissent.
(893) 154 U. . 34, 4 Sup. Ct. 1o8.
"But it has been urged very forcibly on the ground of this decision and
some others, as well as on independent reasoning, that the United States
Supreme Court should review all cases in which the state courts are in
error concerning their own law. See Professor Henry Schofield, The
Supreme Court of the United States and the Enforcement of State Law by
State Courts (i9o8) 3 hi. L. Rxv. 195.
IDissenting opinion of Holmes, J., in Raymond v. Chicago, Un. Tr. Co.
(xgo7) 2o7 U. S. 2o, 28 Sup. Ct. 7, 14.
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We have no new rule from these three cases but we do have in
one of them a square decision on a disputed question and one from
which, in looking forward, we may well inquire how far the
Federal Supreme Court will go in future cases involving state
court interpretation of state law. M. S. B.
REVIVING BARRED DEBT AS A FRAUDULENT "INCUMBRANCE" UNDER
THE BANKRUPTCY ACT
A recent federal decision holds that the revival by an insolvent
debtor just before bankruptcy of a debt barred by the statute
of limitations may be treated as an "incumbrance" of the
debtor's property, and void as such under section 67e of the
Bankruptcy Act. In re Salmon (1916, S. D. N. Y.) 239 Fed.
413.1 In its ordinary meaning, "incumbrance of property'!
denotes some charge or lien attaching to specific property. To
refer to a simple unsecured debt as an incumbrance of property
causes considerable linguistic strain. Moreover, under the
familiar ejusdem generis rule of construction, the term "incum-
brances," in conjunction with its accompanying words in section
67e--"all conveyances, transfers, assignments, or incumbrances
of his property"--would naturally be confined to the narrower
and more usual meaning above suggested. Furthermore, the
purpose of section 67e is to invalidate only such transfers as
would have been fraudulent at common law or would constitute
an act of bankruptcy under section 3 of the Act.
2 The learned
judge says that the destruction by the bankrupt of a valid defense
against the claimant's debt is analogous to a voluntary convey-
ance in fraud of creditors. But at common law a transfer of
property was not fraudulent as to creditors when the debtor was
under a moral obligation to the transferee, though the obligation
was legally unenforceable because of some statutory provision."
The payment of a barred debt was not deemed a badge of fradu-
I For more complete statement of facts, see page i29, infra.
2Coder v. Arts (19o8) 213 U. S. 223, 242; 29 Sup. Ct. 436, 444.
"Bump, Fraudulent Cony. (3d ed.) 223; Del Valle v. Hyland (1894,
N. Y. Sup. Ct) 76 Hun. 493 (outlawed debt); Livermore v. Northrop
(i87o) 44 N. Y. io7 (debt within Statute of lrauds); Wilson v. Russell
(1858) 13 Md. 494 (debt discharged under insolvent laws) ; Gardner v.
Rowe (1825, Eng. V. C.) 2 Sirra & St. 346 (transfer to cestui of land held
on oral trust).
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lent intent but a satisfaction of the debtor's moral obligation to
pay a creditor, for the statute of limitations is usually considered
as merely suspending the creditor's remedy, not as destroying the
debtor's obligation.4 When the statute is waived, the old obliga-
tion again becomes effective.5 The running of the statute creates
in the debtor the power of defeating the claim, if he cares to
exercise it. This power passes to the trustee in bankruptcy, and
cannot, after bankruptcy proceedings have been instituted, be exer-
cised by the debtor.8 But apart from bankruptcy, the privilege of
exercising the power by pleading the statute is personal to the
debtor and he is under no duty to exercise it for the benefit of
other creditors. 7 Consequently it would seem to follow that
creditors cannot object to his releasing or destroying the power by
a new promise, actual or implied from part payment. If sound
policy forbids the revival of barred debts within four months
of bankruptcy, it is believed that further legislation is necessary.
The part payment of a barred debt might (as well as reviving
the debt) constitute a preference, voidable under section 6ob, if
the debtor were charged with notice;8 but it is difficult to see
how such a revival can be avoided as a fraudulent incumbrance
under sec. 67e. The only other cases found on the point are
opposed to the principal case, and would seem to represent the
sounder view.9
M. B.
'Johnson v. Albany & S. R. R. Co. (873) 54 N. Y. 416.
IIlsley v. Jewett (1841, Mass.) 3 Met. 439.
'In re Zorn & Co. (1912, E. D. Pa.) 193 Fed. 299.
TElliot v. Trahern (i89i) 35 W. Va. 634, 643, 14 S. E. 223, 226; see also
Cahill v. Bigelow (1836, Mass.) 18 Pick. 369, 372 (Statute of Frauds).
8See In re Banks (i913, N. D. N. Y.) 207 Fed. 662.
1 In re Banks, supra; In re Blankenship (i915, S. D. Cal.) 22o Fed. 395.
